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Islamic Cities in the World System

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ISLAMIC CITIES IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

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INTRODUCTION

Islam as a way of life has increasingly become a political movement to reckon with not only in Islamic nations, but also internationally. As a result, major Islamic Cities—Beirut, Tehran, Baghdad, Riyadh and Kuwait to name a few—have recently been thrust upon the World stage. This is changing not only the place and role of Islamic cities in the world system and in the Islamic city subsystem, but also leads to basic changes within these cities at the community and neighborhood levels. Assorted Islamic groups, mosques, and associations are beginning to assume a far more active role not only in religious revival but also in providing basic services such as health care, education, nutrition, and welfare. There is a growing civil society and sense of community in Islam, particularly in low income neighborhoods.

This change in cities is taking place at the same time that globalization forces and information technology (computers and connectivity) are suspected of rendering central place hierarchies obsolete and replacing them with diffuse urbanized networks linked by a global communications system. Yet there are also indications that the changing nature of work and new technological imperatives are also reinforcing the value of agglomeration. Ironically, evidence seems to indicate that one of the impacts of the growing power of global and transnational organizations (which effectively subordinates nation states) has been to strengthen the role of cities as the base from which local

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economic and political autonomy interests are expressed (Castells, 1994; Jacobs, 1984).

Most scholars and policy makers interested in cities and in the urban future seem to agree that a historical transformation of urban form is underway, in response to global processes. Some identify the basis of this transformation as changes taking place within world capitalism, while others locate economic restructuring in the broader context of societal evolution. In either case the backbone of such change seems to be what has been termed "a technological informational revolution heralding an information age," which is triggering a restructuring of urban form as profound "as the onset of the industrial era marked for the nineteenth century" (Castells, 1994). We know that the impacts of this process of global change will be felt first and foremost in the major cities of advanced industrial nations as well as in the growing mega-cities of the Third World. Most major Islamic cities seem to be no exception.

This paper attempts to analyze the impacts of the increasing globalization of economic, technological, and cultural systems, along with the rising tide of Islamic movements and revival of traditional values in the Muslim world on the development and integration of Islamic cities, particularly mega-cities. We will not address issues of architecture, aesthetics, and design here, as there already is an extensive literature devoted especially to the built environment, notably publications sponsored by the Aga Khan Award for Architecture organization. And rather than deal with the question of rank in global hierarchies, we chose to focus our attention instead on the emerging pattern of regional interactions within the Islamic city system and the local development processes that are restructuring Islamic mega-cities. The paper is organized in five parts: part one is

a general discussion of the impacts of globalization on Third World cities; part two describes the Islamic world city system; part three summarizes the recent development history of major Islamic cities; part four analyses local responses to globalization; and part five, in conclusion, considers the future of Islamic cities.

Impacts on Globalization on Third World Cities

Any perceptive tourist can observe the visible impacts of the current global process of transformation on major cities in the Third World, as airports, business districts and luxury residential zones now look remarkably similar to those in advanced industrial nations, as a result of the standardization of urban systems. Parallel to this westernization of built forms, consumption habits also reflect the spread of western style dress, music, dance and fast food. In the new global mass society, however, local elites preserve their status by circulating in the exclusive network that links members of the educated, affluent, globe trotting class in both rich and poor nations. In Third World countries, these elites are the fortunate few who receive CNN, speak English and listen to the BBC, have access to the Internet, and do lucrative business with international organizations. Their children are educated at select universities at home or abroad. And they guard their freedoms and privileges by controlling access to the information and opportunities opened up by globalization, and thus present no threat to existing, often authoritarian, governments.

To go beyond these readily apparent impacts of globalization, however, one has to

dig deeper into the urban fabric, below the veneer of westernization and rationalization imposed by modern technology. The two primary causes of the rapid change in the global system taking place today are economic growth and population growth. Therefore, a good place to look for more substantial impacts of globalization within major cities is in innovative local responses to the problems caused by growth, i.e. congestion, pollution, inadequate infrastructure, deficient housing, increasing poverty and social welfare needs. We suspect that the most promising innovations will probably emerge in the marginal areas within large metropolitan regions, through informal experimentation, and the approaches pioneered by local groups, marshaling whatever resources are available to address the needs of the community in a pragmatic fashion.

The Emerging Role of World Cities

One of the first observers of the magnitude of the global changes underway today was economist Kenneth Boulding (1964), who concluded that "the twentieth century marks the middle period of a great transition in the state of the human race," a process he viewed as driven by the growth of knowledge—in other words, the evolution of science, technology and society are interrelated processes. Today, many theorists agree that revolutionary advances in information technology and biological science have forged an even tighter link between the economic forces and cultural capacity of society than existed in the past. For example, Castells (1994:29) argues that in the new postindustrial economy "the productivity and competitiveness of regions and cities is determined by their ability to combine informational capacity, quality of life, and connectivity to the network of major

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metropolitan centers at the national and international levels."

Experts describe the phenomenon of global economic restructuring associated with the rise of the postindustrial economy as characterized by "regional shift, internationalization of the economy, growth of the informal sector, downgrading of manufacturing, flexible specialization of industry, decline of mass production industries, the hollowing out of the corporation, and the domination of central-city economies by financial and business services" (Fainstein and Markusen, 1993: 1468-9). And Global Cities theorists explain that one consequence of this restructuring is that the command and control functions of the international economy now longer are concentrated in one place, but now reside in a system of major world cities (Global Cities) linked by an electronic grid (Friedmann et al, 1987; Sassen, 1991; Fainstein et al., 1992). The multiple locations within the Global City system are not redundant, but serve specialized functions based on the new international division of labor. Moreover, the emergence of this "network of decision-making and information-processing centers" appears to be giving rise to a new urban form, which Castells (1994) has called the Informational City.

Indeed "the potential ability of a city to have direct access ... to any other city or region of the world and the never abating concentration, in the city or around the city, of the most sophisticated intellectual, cultural, and service activities are giving today's city an unprecedented economic and social power" (Bugliarello, 1994:134). As a result of these linkages, Global Cities have more in common with each other than with other cities in their national systems. And as Castells has observed (1994: 29) "[s]uch globalization of urban forms and processes goes beyond the functional and the political to influence

consumption patterns, lifestyles, and formal symbolism."

Globalization and Convergence

To the extent that globalization triggers urban restructuring, therefore, one might

expect to see a convergence in the resulting physical, social and cultural patterns found in

major cities worldwide. The ultimate result of such convergence, as suggested earlier,

could be the creation of a uniform world culture and the loss of distinctive local identity.

Crown prince Hassan Bin Talal of Jordon expressed the concern of many when he

lamented recently that "physically our Middle East cities are quickly losing their

centuries old architectural character and beauty. The ravages of vulgar development has

dwarfed and distorted the architectural treasures." (Saqqaf, 1987: xii). On the other hand,

McNulty and Weinstein (1982) have observed that "contemporary patterns reflect

complex ecological balances between indigenous and foreign, old and new, inter-regional

and inter-local forces." Rather than leading to homogenization, then, empirical evidence

suggests that globalization will produce a rather multifarious urban environment, "filled

with competitive conflicts" (Soja, 1991: 362). As a result, we can understand urban

restructuring as an open-ended process which unfolds differently in each city, and which

is not easily generalized.

Another way to think about convergence, then, is in terms of how different cities

resolve these competitive conflicts. In this way we can see convergent patterns of urban

restructuring in response to globalization as a parallel trend to what political scientists

refer to as "the third wave of global democratization" (Diamond, 1994), and what

planners refer to as "alternative development ." Friedmann (1992) sees the emergence of alternative development approaches—by which ordinary people "transform the world around them for the better" in the face of increasing global integration—as a parallel intellectual movement to the rise of civil society as a collective actor world-wide and the corresponding rise of broad social movements, in particular the environmental and the women's movements. Alternative development theory essentially shifts attention away from business districts to urban neighborhoods; and shifts the analytic perspective to concern with the needs of households and quality of life, as opposed to the needs of firms and economic growth. The objective of alternative development, like many ideologies of the 1990s, is empowerment of citizens through autonomy in community decision making, local self-reliance, participatory democracy and experiential social learning.

New Approaches to Local Economic Development

As a parallel trend to alternative development approaches in the Third World, there has also been a transformation of local economic development approaches in the West, focused on enhancing a local community's ability to generate its own economic base. Michael Teitz (1994) observes that "most of the tools put forward as part of the new economic development originated as local responses to particular problems." In other words, the fundamental shift in development activity that has been observed in both advanced and less developed nations, has mainly been the outcome of grassroots mobilizations to improve urban conditions—and innovation that emerged from the realm of civil society, rather than from political elites.

In this context, values such as "a sense of place" and "commitment to the community" have become perhaps the most salient rallying cries for organized civic action in cities worldwide. And in Third World cities, alternative development strategies serve as a unique medium for the expression of the pressures for democratic change that come from "the 'resurrection of civil society,' the restructuring of public space, and the mobilization of all manner of independent groups and grassroots movements" (Diamond, 1994: 4). The implication here is that local politics *do* reflect global processes, and that examination of the impact of globalization on cities should focus on the role of civil society in local redevelopment politics, that is, social conflict over the use and management of urban resources, particularly land.

To the extent that grass roots groups provide an alternative to the established party system as a vehicle for political participation, we can see the rise of civil society as the informalization of urban politics. Saskia Sassen[1] suggests that studying how informal sectors emerge is an interesting arena in which to explore the limits of old forms and the viability of preexisting structures; and that the place to look for these informal sectors is within the new geography of marginality created by globalization. It is in the margins, she advises, that people can find room to maneuver, as well as opportunities for action. And as Krooth and Moallem (1995) note, agitation for change develops at the margins, as a consequence, or perhaps as resistance to the westernizing effect of modernization. These views support the premise of this paper, that the study of grassroots planning

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[1] Remarks made during a lecture at Rutgers University, 1995.

initiatives can help explain more complex developmental processes at higher levels of social organization.

Internationalization of Third World Cities

The world population has been growing at an exponential rate and despite recent declines in the overall rate of growth, even optimistic projections forecast an enormous increase of population in the future, particularly in less developed regions [*see Table 1*]. Furthermore, the world's population is becoming increasingly urban. Over half of humanity will live in urban areas by the end of this century. Urbanization on such a massive scale clearly has an enormous impact not only on urban areas but also on the world's changing ecosystems. The "'appropriate' carrying capacity" of mega-cities is no longer satisfied "only from their own rural and resource regions but also from 'distant elsewheres' ... In other words, they 'import' sustainability." (Roseland, 1992: 23). Furthermore, the "ecological footprint" of large mega-cities increasingly crosses national as well as municipal borders, reinforcing the interdependence of national economies.

One impli[2]cation of this "irreversible globalization of national economies through networks of cities," is that any change in the global economy will be felt not simply within the Global Cities system, in advanced industrial nations, but also in the mega-cities of the Third World, to the extent that these cities are linked internationally. (CEDARE, 1994). Such links include flows of *people, goods, capital,* and *information* as well as *institutional, cultural* and *political* interactions over time. The nature and extent

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of such interactions, determine the position and role of cities within global and regional

systems, and can be assessed not only by the obvious direct impacts of such interactions

but also by the local responses to problems caused by rapid transformations.

Table 1:

Population Size and Percent Increase:
World, MDRs, LDRs, and Muslim Countries: 1995 - 2025

Area	Est. Pop. 1995 (million) (percent)		Est. Pop. 2025 (million) (percent)		% Increase 1995 to 2025
World	5,759.3	100.0	8,472.5	100.0	47.1
MDRs	1,244.2	21.6	1,403.3	16.6	12.8
LDRs	4,515.1	78.4	7,069.2	83.4	56.6
Muslim Countries*	1,130.0	19.6	1,779.2	20.9	59.3

* Does not include countries where the Muslim population is a significant minority (e.g. in China, India, Russia, the Philippines and several African countries).

Source: United Nations, 1993; and U.S. Census, as reported in: Funk & Wagnals, 1995.

ISLAMIC CITIES IN THE WORLD SYSTEM

Urbanization of the currently Muslim countries dates back to such ancient civilizations as those of the Indus Valley, Mesopotamia, Persia, and the Nile Valley. Currently, seven of the thirty largest cities in the World are in Muslim countries [*see Table 2*]. These are Cairo, Istanbul, Tehran, Karachi, Lahore, Dakha, and Jakarta. Although smaller in size, Algiers, Alexandria, Baghdad, Casablanca, Damascus, Riyadh, and Tunis round-up the dozen or so cities which effectively constitute the top layer of the Islamic World's city system. This urban system serves a Muslim population which is estimated at about one and a quarter billion in 1995, and accounts for over a fifth of the world's total population. It is projected that their population will increase by some 59 percent by the year 2025, to over one and three quarter billions, or about 21 percent of the world population. That is, Islamic countries will have more people than all the developed countries combined. Muslims currently constitute the predominant religious group in at least forty-five countries. Of the World's large cities of one million or more population, there are forty-six Islamic cities accounting for an estimated total of 144 million people in 1995 and a projected 166 in the year 2000 [*seeTable 3*].

Development of Islamic Mega-Cities

The fortunes of the largest Islamic cities are closely tied to those of their countries. In fact both Egypt and Cairo are referred to by the same name (*Misr*) not only in colloquial Egyptian but in most Arab countries as well. These cities are not only the

major economic, political, and cultural centers of their countries but they are also the gateways for most of their global interactions, and to the rest of the world they are effectively synonymous with them. Many of these mega-cities predate the formation of their countries as currently constituted, and even predate Islam.

These seven mega-cities continue to exhibit a high degree of primacy over their systems. For example the population of Jakarta is estimated to be 3.8 times that of the second largest city Bandung; Tehran 3.0 times that of Mashhad; Dhaka 3.0 times that of Chittagong; Istanbul, 2.6 times that of Ankara; and Cairo, 2.4 times that of Alexandria. However, the degree of concentration of national urban populations in these cities has recently been on the decline [seeTable 4]. The degree of primacy of Istanbul seems to have peaked the earliest (in the 1950s), followed by Jakarta's (1960s), and Tehran and Cairo in the 1970s. Karachi and Dhaka seem to have just peaked in the 1990s. However, Cairo, along with Dhaka, continue to house more than a third of their nations' urban populations. These cities' primacy has been, at least in part, due to their role as the primary nodes of global interaction. They are the location of the most important or the only international airport, and in the case of Istanbul, Karachi, and Jakarta, the major seaport. They are also the cultural hubs and the major centers of industry, business, and finance as well as, in the case of capital cities, administration. The most sophisticated people and technology (particularly in communication and information systems) are concentrated in or around these cities.

The degree of concentration of population in the largest cities seem to increase with the extent of government centralization (Cairo and Tehran) and with greater overall

population density (Cairo and Dhaka). Although the rates of population growth of all the cities have slowed down considerably since 1980 [*seeTable 5*], they are still growing rapidly. Of all the major Islamic cities, the Asian cities (Karachi, Dhaka, and Jakarta) continue to be the fastest growing, and are all projected to top 17 million over the next fifteen years. Although Dhaka's population growth rate has declined considerably, from a high of 8.4 in the 1960s, it is still by far the fastest growing of all Islamic mega-cities, at an annual rate of 6.0 percent. Dhaka is also one of the world's poorest and least developed mega cities (U.N., 1987).

Table 2:

The World's Thirty Mega-Cities By Rank in the Year 2010:
Their Growth and Share of National Urban Populations

Rank Mega-Cities by Rank in the year 2000	Mega-Cities	1990 Population (million)	1990 % to Nationa U. Pop.	2010 Population (million)	2010 % to National U. Pop.	Ave. Annual Growth Rate 1995 - 2000
1	Tokyo	25.0	26.24	28.9	27.14	0.82
2	Sao Paulo	18.1	16.16	25.0	15.08	1.77
3	Bombay	12.2	5.66	24.4	6.07	3.68
4	Shanghai	13.4	4.45	21.7	3.58	2.76
5	Lagos	7.7	20.29	21.1	20.91	5.41
6	Mexico City	15.1	24.6	18.0	18.64	0.80
7	Beijing	10.9	3.60	18.0	2.97	2.89
8	Dhaka	6.6	35.2	17.6	32.65	5.30
9	New York	16.1	8.54	17.2	7.23	0.39
10	Jakarta	9.2	17.35	17.2	15.77	3.49
11	Karachi	7.9	21.01	17.0	18.94	3.94
12	Metro Manila	8.9	33.32	16.1	32.24	3.25
13	Tianjin	9.2	3.06	15.7	2.59	3.04
14	Calcutta	10.7	4.97	15.7	3.91	1.65
15	Delhi	8.2	3.78	15.6	3.88	3.36
16	Los Angeles	11.5	6.09	13.9	5.84	1.16
17	Seoul	11.0	35.09	13.8	32.41	0.92
18	Buenos Aires	11.4	41.14	13.7	37.57	1.02
19	Cairo	8.6	37.48	13.4	33.38	2.17
20	Rio de Janeiro	10.9	9.76	13.3	8.05	0.95
22	Tehran	6.7	20.09	11.9	16.37	2.93
21	Bangkok	7.1	58.34	12.7	52.10	3.06
23	Istanbul	6.5	19.07	11.8	18.14	3.53
24	Osaka	10.5	11.0	10.6	9.95	0.00
25	Moscow	9.0	--	10.4	--	0.69
26	Lima	6.5	43.05	10.1	41.26	2.43
27	Paris	9.3	22.65	9.6	20.87	0.15
28	Hyderabad	4.1	1.91	9.4	2.34	4.48
29	Lahore	4.2	11.05	8.8	9.83	3.86
30	Madras	5.3	2.44	8.4	2.08	2.13

Note: Shading indicates the mega-cities in the Muslim World. In addition other important cities excluded from this table because of their smaller size include: **Alexandria, Algiers, Ankara, Baghdad, Casablanca, Damascus, Esfahan, Kano, Tunis** and **Riyadh.**

Source: United Nations, 1993, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 1992 Revision; Estimates and Projections of Urban and Rural Populations and of Urban Agglomerations,* New York: United Nations.

**Total Population, Percent Muslim, and Large Cities (+1 million in 1995)
in Countries where Muslims Constitute The Largest Religious Group.**

Country	Population Est. 1995 (million)	Percent Muslim	Large Cities (+1 million)	City's Population (in millions)	
				1995	2000
Europe:					
Albania	3.4	70.0	--		
Bosnia/Hertz.	4.6	40.0	--		
Turkey	62.0	98.0	Istanbul	7.8	9.3
			Ankara	2.8	3.2
			Izmir	2.2	2.5
			Adana	2.0	2.4
Africa :					
Algeria	28.6	99.0	Algiers	3.7	4.5
Chad	6.4	44.0	--		
Djibouti	0.5	94.0	--		
Egypt	58.5	94.0	Cairo	9.7	10.8
			Alexandria	3.6	4.0
Eritrea	3.2	50.0	--		
Gambia	1.0	90.0	--		
Guinea	6.7	85.0	Conakry	1.5	2.0
Libya	5.4	97.0	Tripoli	3.3	4.0
Mali	10.8	90.0	--		
Mauritania	2.3	100.0	--		
Morocco	28.3	99.0	Casablanca	3.3	3.8
			Rabat	1.6	1.9
Niger	9.1	80.0	--		
Nigeria *	126.9	50.0	--		
Senegal	8.4	92.0	Dakar	2.0	2.4
Somalia	10.2	99.0	--		
Sudan	29.0	70.0	Khartoum	2.5	3.0
Tunisia	8.9	98.0	Tunis	2.1	2.4
Western Sahara	0.3	NA	--		
Asia:					
Afghanistan	23.2	99.0	Kabul	2.1	2.6
Azerbaijan	7.7	85.0	Baku	1.8	1.9
Bahrain	0.6	100.0	--		
Bangladesh	128.3	83.0	Dhaka	8.8	11.5
			Chittagong	2.9	3.8
Brunei	0.3	63.0	--		
Gaza/ W.Bank	0.7	NA	--		
Indonesia	201.5	87.0	Jakarta	11.2	13.4
			Bandung	3.0	3.6

Table 3 (Continued):

Country	Percent Est. 1995 (million)	Large Cities Muslim	City's Population (+1 million)	(in millions) 1995	2000
Asia (continued):					
Indonesia (cont.)			Surabaja	2.8	3.4
			Medan	2.3	2.7
			Semarang	1.5	1.8
			Palembang	1.5	1.8
Iran	66.7	95.0	Tehran	7.5	8.7
			Mashhad	2.5	3.2
			Tabriz	1.8	2.2
			Esfahan	1.8	2.2
			Shiraz	1.5	2.0
Iraq	21.2	97.0	Baghdad	4.5	5.1
Jordan	4.8	92.0	Aman	1.2	1.5
Kazakhstan	17.3	47.0	Alm-Ata	1.3	1.4
Kuwait	1.6	95.0	Kuwait City	1.0	1.1
kyrgyzstan	4.7	70.0	--		
Lebanon	3.0	70.0	--		
Malaysia	20.1	NA	Kuala Lumpur	2.1	2.5
Oman	1.8	75.0	--		
Pakistan	135.0	97.0	Karachi	9.8	11.9
			Lahore	5.0	6.1
			Faisalabad	1.9	2.3
			Peshawar	1.7	2.1
			Gujranwala	1.6	2.1
			Rawalpindi	1.3	1.6
			Multan	1.2	1.5
Qatar	0.5	95.0	--		
Saudi Arabia	17.6	100.0	Riyadh	2.6	3.3
			Jeddah	1.5	1.8
Syria	14.8	90.0	Damascus	2.1	2.9
			Aleppo	2.2	2.7
Tajikistan	6.0	90.0	--		
UAE	1.8	96.0	--		
Uzbekistan	22.6	95.0	Tashkent	2.2	2.4
Yemen	13.9	95.0	--		

Source: United Nations,1991; Robinson, 1982; and Funk & Wagnals, 1995.

* Although Nigeria's predominant religion is Islam, Muslims are concentrated in the north, and the largest cities with majority Muslim population (Kano, Sokoto and Kaduna) are smaller than one

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million in population size.

Table 4:

**Population of the Mega-City as a Percentage of
its Country's National Urban Population**

City / Country	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Cairo / Egypt	37.1	37.8	**38.2**	38.2	37.5	35.8	33.4
Istanbul / Turkey	**24.5**	21.3	20.5	22.6	19.1	18.3	18.1
Tehran / Iran	22.8	25.5	**27.6**	26.0	20.1	17.6	16.4
Karachi / Pakistan	14.9	16.7	19.1	20.1	**21.0**	20.3	18.9
Dhaka / Bangladesh	23.7	24.5	29.6	33.0	**35.2**	34.8	32.7
Jakarta / Indonesia	14.8	**19.1**	19.1	17.9	17.4	16.8	15.8

Source : United Nations, 1993.

Table 5:

**Average Annual Rate of Growth of the
Muslim Mega- Cities**

City	1950-1960	1960-1970	1970-1980	1980-1990	1990-2000
Cairo	**4.3**	3.6	2.6	2.7	2.7
Istanbul	**4.8**	4.7	4.6	4.1	3.6
Tehran	**5.9**	5.6	4.4	2.9	2.3
Karachi	**5.9**	5.2	4.6	4.4	4.1
Dhaka	4.3	**8.4**	7.8	7.0	6.0
Jakarta	3.4	3.4	4.2	**4.4**	4.0

Source : Chen and Heligman, 1994: 26.

The Islamic World City Subsystem

Many of the current major Islamic cities served as seats of extensive empires at different points in their history (Abdel Kader, 1975). Damascus was the center of the expanding Islamic world under the Omayyads in the seventh and eighth centuries, when Islam spread from China to Spain. Baghdad was the seat of the Abbasid caliphate from 730 to 1258 AD. Cairo was the capital of the Fatimite dynasty which ruled North Africa, Syria, Palestine and the Hejaz (Arabia) from 909 to 1171 AD. Constantinople which was the center of the Byzantine Empire became the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and was renamed Istanbul in 1453. Two other Muslim empires co-existed with the Ottomans around 1700, one in India (the Mogul empire) and the other in Persia (the Safavid empire)

Islamic cities of the middle ages (Makkah, Damascus, Baghdad, Istanbul, Cairo, Alexandria, Esfahan and Delhi) flourished with the great expansion of Islamic civilization as an inter-connected world city sub-system in the premodern era. They were connected primarily by caravan and maritime routes. Most great cities originated as ports on the sea (e.g. Istanbul, Casablanca, Alexandria, Beirut, Jeddah, and Karachi) or along rivers (Cairo and Baghdad) and were well connected by maritime routes. In modern times, however, advances in transportation, aviation, and tele-communications technology gave interior cities, which had relatively been isolated (e.g. Riyadh, Tehran, and Ankara) instant international access, visibility, and role in the world system by connecting them into the international web. Aviation and telecommunications infrastructures are becoming defining elements in any city's world status and ability to assume leading roles in international business and finance (Bugliarello, 1994).

The predominant factor unifying the Islamic world city sub-system continues to be Islam itself. All Muslims around the globe still face Makkah in their five daily prayers and, as the technology and safety of travel improves, they flock in greater numbers every year to that holy city for Hajj (pilgrimage) and Umrah visits. The number of visitors exceeded 2.5 million in 1983, and they pumped more than $1 billion in Makkah's economy, which constituted more than a third of its annual consumer spending. Hajj is becoming a truly global event without parallel drawing the community of believers (*UMMAH*) "from all major world regions and most cultural, racial, and national backgrounds" (Toulan, 1993). It is the greatest global face-to-face gathering and expression of unity.

Other measures of unity of the Islamic city system include the multi-national organizations and political movements that link the Muslim world. The Organization of Islamic Conference, headquartered in Jeddah, has the welfare of Muslims around the world as its primary focus. It often rotates its meetings among different cities in member states. The league of Arab Nations, headquartered in Cairo, is concerned not only with political questions but also with issues of trade, foreign aid, and economic development. Its concerns often extend to other Muslim countries. The Gulf cooperation Council headquartered in Riyadh was established in 1981 to provide a framework for common actions for the Gulf oil countries in face of the Iran/Iraq war. Finally, the Kuwaiti Fund for Development was created to provide aid for economic development to Arab and Muslim countries.

That sense of community (*Umma*) in Islam, based on faith rather than on kinship

(Galantay, 1987), also manifests itself as an important unifying force at the grass-roots

levels in popular movements ranging from concern for the plight of the Palestinians to the

political organization of the Muslim Brothers founded in Cairo in 1928. As a religious

movement it initially focused on educational, social, charitable, and religious work and

engaged in some economic enterprises. Through a tumultuous history of conflict and

appeasement with governments, particularly in Egypt, the Muslim Brothers movement

spread into other Arab Countries and beyond, and gained moral and material support at

different times from conservative Muslim regimes, including the Saudi and Iranian

monarchies (Lewis, 1993). The Muslim Brothers experience spawned several other

organizations in different countries. Several of these were more militant but most played

a significant role in community development.

Economic linkages have once more become extremely important with the advent

of oil riches in the Muslim countries of the Middle East. The consequent upsurge in

employment opportunities, particularly in construction, resulted in some of the largest

migratory labor movements in post W.W.II history. Although Muslim labor has moved in

great numbers to the West (estimated at 1.3 million in 1977, including a third of a million

Algerians in France and half a million Turks in Germany) (Miller, 1981) Labor moved in

even greater numbers to the Oil Rich but labor poor Arab countries (Libya, Saudi Arabia,

Iraq, and the Persian Gulf region). Migrant workers represented one third of their labor

force, or 4.5 million in 1985 (Osman, 1987). They come primarily from the heavily

populated poorer countries (Egypt, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Yemen, and the

Palestinian West Bank and Gaza) [*seeTable 6*]. Labor comes also from far-off Muslim communities in Africa or the Philippines, as well as much smaller numbers of non-Muslims from Korea and the West. This movement resulted in major transfer of resources in both labor and remittances.

In addition to the circulatory movements of migrant labor, the oil riches also resulted in movements of regional capital and tourists which further connects the Muslim city system. Branches of major Arab banks were opened in almost all major Arab cities. Bahrain took over the function of being the Arab world's financial center from Beirut after the break-out of the Lebanese civil war in the mid-seventies (Pepper, 1991). Arab Real estate investments which traditionally went to Beirut promptly shifted to Cairo and other cities, as did Arab tourism This is evidence not only that there are interactions the Islamic city system, but also of the substitutability of locations within it , particularly in its Arab component.

Table 6:
Income, Assistance, Debt, and Workers Remittances to Selected Muslim Countries.

Country	GNP per capita U.S. $ 1992	Development assistance 1991		Total ext. debt $ million 1987*	Migrant workers to M.E.(000) 1992	Net workers remittances $ million
		$ mill.	$ p/c1992			
Egypt	640	4,988	93.1	40,018	586	5,430
Turkey	1,980	1,675	29.2	54,772	180	3,008
Iran	2,200	194	3.4	14,167	--	--
Pakistan	420	1,226	10.6	24,072	450	1,468
Bangladesh	220	1,636	14.6	13,189	180	848
Indonesia	670	1,854	10.2	84,385	45	184
UAE	22,020	-6	-3.7	--	--	--
Saudi Arabia	7,510	45	2.7	--	--	--

Sources: World Bank, 1994
* Estimated from: Osman, 1987, and various ILO and other sources.

PLAYERS ON THE WORLD SCENE

Thus far we discussed the interactions within the Islamic city system itself. However, in the new globalism, cities, rather than nation states or regions, are becoming the global nodes of interaction. Thus specific cities which are well connected in transnational information and exchange networks are likely to play multiple roles in national, regional, as well as global city systems. In order to assess the role that major Islamic cities play in the world system, and conversely the impact of globalization on them, we inevitably had to focus our investigation on a few cities.

We selected to focus on the three mega-cities which have recently been most visible on the world scene, namely: Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran. Cairo plays a central role in both the Arab and Muslim worlds in addition to Africa. She is the seat of the League of Arab Nations, and the Islamic world's bridge to Africa. Istanbul has been the most liberalized and westernized major Muslim urban center, at least up to now, and is literally the link between Europe and Asia, and between the Muslim world and the West. On the other hand, Tehran spearheaded the only successful Islamic revolution in recent history and continues to advocate a non-Western approach to development based on Islamic teachings and values. It acts as both a role model and a pro-active participant in Islamic revival movements and in resistance movements in the region.

These three cities also represent the diverse emerging currents of religious, civic, and urban developments in the Muslim world. They also embody the diversity of the ethnic and cultural roots of Islam: Arab/African, Byzantine/Ottoman/European, and central Asian/Persian cultures and empires. The three largest Islamic cities, Dhaka, Jakarta, and Karachi, certainly deserve a detailed analysis of their own which would require another paper.

Cairo At The Crossroads

Cairo has been the capital of Egypt for over 1000 years. Her roots actually go further back to the Arab invasion of Egypt in the seventh century. She served as the capital of the Fatimite and Ayubide dynasties (969-1254) which expanded Cairo's influence greatly under Salah el-Din, over Syria, Palestine and the Hejaz. Later Cairo was

a principal provincial capital under the Ottoman empire. Since her establishment in the tenth century, Cairo has been a major cross- roads for trade between the East and the West, particularly prior to the discovery of the Cape of Good Hope and the building of the Suez canal.

At an estimated metropolitan area population of over 14 million in 1994 and a projected 17 million for 2000, Cairo is the largest metropolitan area in the Arab world, Africa, the Middle east, and the Islamic World (Hassan, 1994; U.N., 1990). As such she commands an important role in multiple and overlapping world city sub-systems: African, Arab, Mediterranean, and Islamic. Khedive Ismael (1863-1879), sought to make Cairo a European city (Ibrahim, 1987). Since then and through the colonial period (British Occupation: 1881- 1956)), large numbers of foreigners from Europe settled in Egypt, mainly in Cairo and Alexandria. Much of modern Cairo (complete with European-like suburbs such as Garden City, Zamalek, Heliopolis, and Maadi) was built during that period by European companies and according to European plans.

After a period of experimentation with Arab socialism and public sector centralized planning, Egypt adopted an "open door" policy, once again in the mid-seventies, designed to attract foreign investments. In addition Egypt liberalized property laws to allow foreigners to own land. There were major increases in foreign assistance to the tune of $ 5 billion a year (particularly from the U.S. following the 1979 Camp David accords). Workers remittances from migrant labor in the Arab countries amounted to another $5 billion in 1992 [see Table 6]. Over three million tourists (3.2

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million to be exact) brought in $2.3 billion in foreign currency In 1992[3], Tourism revenue

was more than twice as much as that of the Suez Canal ($1 billion), and almost as much

as oil ($3 billion) (El-Masry, 1992; UPS, 1994).

Cairo became home for the world's largest American embassy, the largest AID

mission, and for a large number of branches of U.S. multinational corporations, including

GM, Coca Cola, IBM, AT&T, John Deer, and Colgate (UPS). American fast food

franchises multiplied in numbers, including KFC, Pizza Hut, and at last count 25

McDonalds. Cairo is also home for branches of several international financial institutions.

As mentioned above tourism increased rapidly, accounting for the largest foreign

exchange earnings after the oil revenues. Almost 44 percent of the tourists in 1990 were

from the Arab countries (Hassan, 1994)[4]. Thus Egypt and Cairo have become greatly

dependent on infusions of foreign assistance and vulnerable to the political whims of the

West (Krooth and Moallem, 1995).

During the last twenty years, trade imbalances and the national debt multiplied

and inflation became rampant, generally in double digits as high as 35 percent.

Disparities in income and in quality of life between the rich and the poor increased

greatly. Eighty percent of the "new millionaires" of Egypt live in Cairo, and at 200,000

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[3]According to Egyptian sociologist Saad El-din Ibrahim (1987), 300 new nightclubs opened in Cairo in the 1970s double the number built over the previous 20 years. This is very likely a response to the demise of Beirut's entertainment role in the Arab world, and was made possible by the new open door policy in Egypt.

[4]An invasion of Cairo by Russian ballerina/converted belly dancers was reported by the New York Times (6,9,1995). As foreigners, such dancers are not subject to the moral dress code and performance restrictions that Egyptian dancers are, and thus attract more tourists.

constitute barely 5 percent of the city's population but receive 50 percent of its income (Sobhi, 1987: 237). On the other hand, it is estimated that 23 percent of Egypt's population live in "abject poverty" 20 percent of the labor force are unemployed and another 20 percent underemployed (Krooth and Moallem, 1995). Infusion of capital and remittances into housing drove land prices and construction costs in Cairo to unprecedented levels. Land values multiplied 10 times and construction cost five times between 1975 and 1982 (TAKAA, 1984:97). Thus there was a disproportionate increase in the supply of luxury housing, while the population living in old cemeteries and squatters multiplied at least four times. Poverty stricken districts function like inward looking cities unto themselves and house large populations, of up to one million in the case of Imbaba, primarily in informal housing.

Despite the fact that Cairo now has a relatively clean and well run subway system, the number of private vehicles has been rapidly increasing at 17% per annum, resulting in major congestion. Uncontrolled emissions from autos and industries (Cairo continues to be Egypt's primary industrial center with 36% of its manufacturing labor) contributed to worsening air pollution. Cairo is now second only to Mexico city as the most polluted capital city in the world (U.N., 1990; Hassan, 1994).

All these problems not withstanding, Cairo continues to be seen as the cultural center of the Arab world, especially in terms of popular culture (Theroux, 1993), and is also the seat for a number of African economic, political, sport, and social organizations. Egypt was elected as head of the Organization of African Unity several times, twice in the last decade, and such functions are obviously located in Cairo. Cairo, also continues

to assume a primary responsibility for Islamic education through Al-Azhar University which hosts a large number of foreign students and scholars from Islamic countries, and attempts to maintain a leadership role in the Islamic world by steering a fine course between tradition and modernity. while suppressing those who are calling for either a Western style democracy or an Islamic state. As a result, Egypt and Cairo are currently the scene of major civic and religious conflicts.

Istanbul's Secularization

Founded around 667 BC as Byzantium by the Greeks, Istanbul has had a long history as the capital of three states: the Byzantine Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and the Turkish Republic. The present city, initially named Constantinoble, was consciously created by Constantine the Great to be a world center which grew to be the largest city in medieval Europe with over one million inhabitants. It is the only city in the world that straddles two continents (Asia and Europe) across the Bosphorus (Danielson and Keles, 1985). This link is clearly not only geographic but social, cultural, and political as well. Istanbul's links with Europe greatly enhanced its economic dominance in the 19th century, and its development was strongly shaped by the influx of Europeans, their businesses, ideas, lifestyles, and foreign capital.

The reform movements in turkey, started with the Tanzimat (reorganizations) towards equality in the mid-1800s. This continued through the Young Turks' pressures for modernization through Westernization at the end of the Nineteenth century. It culminated with the Kemalist reforms in the 1920s which established secular laws based

on Western models, as well as a new capital, Ankara, in the interior. Turkey is the only

officially secular country with nearly 98 percent Muslim population. It is one of only two

Muslim countries(the other is Tunisia) who has replaced the Islamic Sharia personal

status laws with a gender equitable civil law code (Moghadam, 1993). It has had a

functioning multiparty competitive democratic system since 1946, which provides a great

leverage and voice to the urban population particularly squatter residents. Turkey's

democracy, however, has not been without turbulence (Danielson and Keles, 1985)

Though no longer the capital, Istanbul regained its status as the premier

cosmopolitan center of Turkey. It is the largest port and the largest industrial center (with

a population of over 8 million. It is also the center for intellectual, cultural, commercial,

and tourist activities as well as the preferred residence of the elite in modern Turkey.

Istanbul's metropolitan area accounts for only 10 percent of the population, but is home

for 45 percent of all industry, 40 percent of all commerce, 24 percent of all vehicles, 25

percent of all transportation and communications activity, 44 percent of the country's

hotel rooms, and one half of Turkey's university students. It is home for the Istanbul

Technical University and School of Design, a major regional center of higher education (

Danielson and Keles, 1985). Istanbul is also going to host the second major international

U. N. conference on human settlements, Habitat II, in 1996..

Turkey often classified itself as part of Europe and eventually joined NATO. An

extensive highway system and the Bosphorus bridge facilitated greater flows of

commerce and goods through the metropolis. The area expanded greatly on both sides,

with about two thirds of the population, the business center, and financial and trade

activities on the European side, and most heavy industry and squatter settlement on the
Asiatic side. Nearly two-fifths of Istanbul's population are housed in *gecekondus* (literally
housing "thrown up overnight"), which occupy marginal and publicly owned land.

Recent plans have focused on : the construction of the second Bosphorus
bridge(1985), the metro project, a world trade center, another harbor, and five big tourist
hotels along with a host of other environmental and infrastructure projects (IEMB, 1988).
Istanbul retains it strategic importance by virtue of its location on the Bosphorus which
provides the only access to the Mediterranean for Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, and
Romania among others. Land traffic across the Bosphorus is also intense (Noe, 1991).
This gives Turkey, and Istanbul a pivotal role in the emerging geopolitical changes in the
Black Sea and the Balkan regions.

Tehran Under the Islamic Regime

Tehran, like other major capitals of Iran, was located along the famous Silk Route
of the ancient world linking China with the Syrian port of Antioch on the Mediterranean
(Kheirabadi, 1991). Though not Iran's oldest or most religiously revered city, Tehran had
consolidated its grip on the country. By the 1970's, Tehran had 54.5 percent of all
telephone service, 52.9 percent of all banking units in the largest cities, and 82.7 percent
of all nationally registered companies. In addition, it had 60 percent of the national
employment in wholesale and 40 percent in retail, 41 percent of all insurance companies,
and 47.2 percent of all investment in construction activities (Amirahmadi, 1995).

Like Turkey and Morocco, Iran's westernization started early in this century. Reza

Shah (1925-41) decided to modernize major cities by simply driving major networks of

long straight roads through the heart of the traditional city (Clark, 1980).[5] In the 1950s the

"CIA undercut the plebiscite putting Mosaddeq in power, picking the shah of Iran to

replace him" (Krooth and Moallem, 1995). The Shah dutifully aligned himself with the

West and embarked on a road of elitist modernization of Iran and globalization of Tehran.

By the late 1970s, hundreds of foreign companies were operating in Iran, located

primarily in Tehran, in all fields including communication, transportation, computers, and

banking.[6] Iran's modernization under the Shah was both alien and authoritarian.

Thus, the Islamic revolution in 1979 was a revolution against political repression,

extreme economic inequality and deprivation[7], Westernization and perceived Westernized

decadence. It was a move towards Islamism in its unadulterated form. Long after the

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[5] Traditional Iranian cities have been greatly influenced by Islam, particularly its Shi'ite branch. The importance, arrangement, interaction, and use of major public buildings are determined by their religious function, and are usually integrated within the bazaar. The bazaar is an integral part or even the heart of Iranian cities. It usually includes the main Friday Mosque and other religious institutions, forms all or part of main street, and "is the focus of public life as the major commercial center, it is also the center of social, cultural, recreational, religious, and political activities" (Kheirabadi, 1991:49).

[6] There were 25 to 30 companies in communication, 12 in computer services, and 45 suppliers of transmission and distribution equipment. These included G.E, Honeywell, Westinghouse, GTE, and GM. In addition to General Motors there were nine other Swedish, German, Japanese, and American automobile licensing and assembly operations. In banking, some 40 foreign banks; including Chase Manhattan and Citybank, had major branches in Tehran (Amirahmadi, 1995).

[7] According to Galantay (1987:15), the ultimate irritant that triggered the riots against the Shah was the ambitious business project of *Shahastan Pahlevi* to be built on Shah's family land on the hills north of the city and supplied with a subway and modern infrastructure at public cost. It would have brought a tremendous windfall for land owners in the area. Such " accumulation of excessive profit is contrary to the egalitarian and charitable principles of Islam".

revolution, however, the bazzar and the neighborhoods around it continue to be the focus of the traditional city and of the poor. The wealthy still inhabit the higher neighborhoods and, like their counterpart in Cairo, frequent the expensive restaurants where a family can spend 50,000 rials for one supper, which is a month's wage for an average normal person (Pellizzari, 1987)

Following the 1979 revolution, Iran's and by implication Tehran's international connections took on a major regional focus, partly because of severing relations with the Western sources of capital particularly the U.S., partly as a result of the Afghan war and the break-up of the Soviet Union, and partly by desire to become a regional power in central Asia, the Islamic world, and the Persian Gulf. Currently the Iranian government's budget includes an official allocation for the Palestenian resistance movement, and unofficially helps movements in Lebanon, Afghanistan and the Sudan.

The headquarters of the Economic Cooperation Organization is in Tehran[8], and Iran plays an important role in the Caspian Sea Organization (Iran, Azerbaijin, Russia, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan), and in OPEC. A railroad linking Iran's northern borders with the Persian Gulf has finally made the Gulf accessible to the Russian and central Asian republics. Iran is home for some four million Afghani, Kurd, and central Asian refugees. Another million or so Afghani seasonal migrant laborers come to Iran for temporary work, and young Iranian migrant workers estimated in the tens of thousands

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[8]The ECO initially founded by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey as the RCD in 1964. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ECO was joined by Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrghizstan and Tajikistan, and in 1993 by Afghanistan. The ECO decided to establish a trade and development bank in Turkey, an insurance company in Pakistan, and shipping and airlines in Tehran. It has an observer status with the U.N. (Neikpour 1995).

prefer to go to Japan (Neikpour, 1995).

Iran's efforts to re-establish its global connections have shifted east to India,

China, and Japan.[9] Tehran has recently inaugurated what is described as the Largest

telecommunications center in the Middle East(Neikpur, 1995). The current government

has also been attempting a liberalization and a wider open door policy since 1988. High

government bureaucrats in Tehran routinely receive CNN in their offices, and an

estimated 14 percent of Tehranians listen to the BBC. The government sponsers a large

number of conferences and symposia inviting foreigners from all-over the world,

including Iranian expatriates.[10]

Islamic City Roles in a Global Context

Cairo, Istanbul, and Tehran seem to have already developed major regional

networks of interactions in which they play a pivotal role. They are likely to strengthen

such regional roles in the future and thus command positions as important second tier

nodes in the global city system. This scenario is all the more likely because the Arab

countries and Iran (a large part of the Islamic world) control a substantial part of the

world's oil reserves, command major capital resources, and represent significant markets.

As the Arab oil embargo (1973), and the Gulf war (1991) have shown, the world

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[9]International corporations that currently have branches in Tehran include: Sony, Panasonic, National, Phillips, AEG, and Caterpillar.

[10]An estimated 1.5 million relatively affluent Iranian's live abroad, mainly in the West (Amirahmadi, 1995).

economies particularly those of the West have vital interests in that important Middle Eastern source of energy.

Furthermore, the Muslim world in general and particularly major Islamic cities command strategic locations and control major international transportation links. These include vital oil pipelines and critical sea, land, and rail routes. For instance, the Suez Canal and the Bosphorous provide strategic maritime links between East and West and between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. Also the north-south railroad in Iran provides crucial access to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea for Russia and the newly independent central Asian republics.

Of the three major Muslim world regional centers discussed above, Cairo appears to be the most likely candidate for a leading role in the Islamic world city system, provided that she maintains her relative economic openness and religious middle-of- the-road path. This seems to be in large part a function of Cairo's ability to resolve transformational conflicts through local developmental processes. Globalization in effect sharpens the basic conflict which exists between the old (population), which embodies "tradition and Islamic values, indigenous culture and ways of life, and the new, which is the incarnation of secularism, modernity, the West, wealth, and power." This is becoming more dramatic in Cairo with the declining economy and the spreading disillusionment with everything Western (Ross, 1987:58). The increasing frustration, alienation, and identity crisis fuels the resurgence of Islamicist movements which sees "an unholy alliance between the foreign world and the domestic elite" (Ross, 1987:58), and attempts to resist widespread moral corruption and breakdown of traditional institutions (Jawad,

1994).

LOCAL RESPONSES

Since there are no predetermined outcomes to the process of urban restructuring

in response to global forces, investigation of restructuring in specific cities should focus

more on the process of change instead of indicators of impacts. Rather than search for

unambiguous evidence of the direction of change—which implies there is a continuum

along which the emergent urban forms have been 'more' or 'less' achieved—the task

becomes to specify what paths away from current practice are likely and what affects the

probabilities that one or another of those paths will be followed.

However, in order to theoretically link observations at the micro level of local

development to observations at the macro level of global processes what is needed is a

multi-disciplinary, policy oriented approach—a theoretical perspective referred to here as

political ecology.[11] Political ecology provides an analytic framework to study urban

restructuring on two levels, namely, the ecological and the political. The contemporary

concept of the city as an ecosystem is based on a holistic vision of urban life. This view

implies that change in one component of the urban system, say economic restructuring,

resonate throughout the entire system, i.e. as social change, political reform and shifts in

organized religion. The political ecology framework allows us to explain the broader

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[11] A concept proposed by Ellen Shoshkes, as described in several unpublished papers including "Political Ecology of Community Based Housing" presented at the ACSP annual conference, 1994, Phoenix, AZ.

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significance of local redevelopment projects by charting the dynamics of the planning and development process within the urban system. In the next section we discuss examples of local redevelopment projects in Cairo, Istanbul and Jakarta, that reveal evidence of restructuring in response to globalization, as viewed from the political ecology analytic perspective.[12]

Cairo: Cultural Park for Children[13]

The Cultural Park for Children opened in 1990, in Abu al-Dahab, a poor neighborhood in the community of Sayyida Zeinab, "the heart of medieval Cairo." Inserted into this congested, derelict setting, the two and half acre park is like an oasis, filled with libraries, art studios, computer facilities, playgrounds, fountains and stages. Monuments surrounding the site inspired the park's design, a complex arrangement of geometric patterns, but architect Abdelhalim Ibrahim Abdelhalim relied on the input of local residents to determine the final layout. While the design of parks with citizen input is a common strategy for neighborhood revitalization schemes in the West, this approach is still rare in Egypt. On one level this project is yet another example of innovation diffusion through the agency of educated elites. In a larger context, however, we can see the adoption of this process innovation in Cairo as evidence of fundamental change in response to globalization.

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[12]The examples are drawn from recent publications and news articles, as noted.

[13] Description of the Cultural Park for Children and all quotations from text in (Steele, 1990: pp. 29-32).

The Children's Park illustrates how communities in Islamic cities, like other major cities worldwide, seek to accommodate growth and change in a way that allows continuity with the city's past. In this case, the architect developed his proposal for the park around the theme of growth, basing the design concept on the spiral form, as a symbol of growth in nature, and on geometry. The spiral form is dominant in the local skyline, as there are several historic mosques including in the vicinity. Together the spiral and geometric forms express the integration of the natural and the man-made world—a development objective now valued worldwide. The scheme also proposed that community residents participate in the planning of the park. In this way he is clearly influenced by the work of architect Charles Moore. Moore, an advocate of community involvement in design, has inspired a whole generation of planning and design professionals, particularly graduates of UC Berkely, where he taught, including Adelhalim, who studied there. But ironically, popular involvement in design was actually the traditional pattern for urban growth in Sayyida Zeinab, long ago.

But of particular interest here is the way in which the architect mobilized popular support to overcome bureaucratic resistance that threatened to sink the project—a strategy that has been aptly described as "a perfect example of political rather than aesthetic innovation." After his firm won the competition for the commission, government officials kept delaying the signing of a contract. Apparently, "political interest groups in the Parliament" had blocked the project. Adelhalim recalls: "[T]he people in the community, the real supporters of the project, had no contact with either ... the press [or] the power structure, which in any case [were] confused about the image of the project .... We

realized that we would have to mobilize the community to get the project moving. ... The opportunity [to do this] came when the Minister of Culture [the client] decided to lay the corner-stone of the project during the National Festival for Children."

The architect proposed that a life-size model of the scheme be built, rather than simply display drawings as is usually done on such occasions. He also suggested inviting artists to create works to be performed by local schoolchildren. "In this way we sought to restore the age-old function of the building ceremony that had been traditional in Egypt, from the Luxor Temple and mosque of Ibn Tulun almost up to the present day." The Minister agreed, and local officials then quickly contracted schools and artists, and transformed the vacant lot into "a fabulous scene." As he reports: "The children began to arrive to rehearse .... while a choreographer ... worked out the performance to follow the configuration of the scheme. When they could not, we changed the ... arrangement. This happened several times and each time the scheme was improved. ... I came actually to believe what I had claimed to the Minister, that the great buildings of Egypt were always the result of ceremony."

In this way the traditional event gained new significance, as a way of stimulating the community's interest and engage their active support of the project. Moreover, it led to the expansion of the project to include Abu- al-Dahab Street, symbolically extending the improvements into the neighborhood. This was important, as without the help of local officials, the architect would not have been able either to stage the ceremony or overcome bureaucratic resistance at higher levels of government. The completed park is an apparent success. For example, teachers use the parks historically inspired but boldly modern

architectural forms to teach children about the surrounding monuments and local history. And they use the parks geometric features to teach al-Khwarazmi's contributions to mathematics. In this way, the park is the physical realization of the architect's view of tradition, "as a living ... 'envelope' of culture." The most important impact of the park, perhaps, is as a testimony to the power of civic action to bring about positive change to help reverse neighborhood decline, and how the redesign of a vacant lot can provide a dynamic, imaginative vision of a modern future comfortably linked with a proud past.

Istanbul: Community Development

In Istanbul, as reported recently in the New York Times:[14] "Room by room, Alawite Muslims in the Gazi Mahallesi district [which is on the European side of the Bosphorous] are building their own community center—a cross between a house of prayer, a social club, a funeral parlor and a neighborhood dining room that can serve 1,000 meals at a time." In doing so the Alawite group is following a long standing tradition, as the basic organizational units of the cities of the Ottoman Empire were communities formed along religious lines.[15] From Belgrade to Damascus, these communities were linked with the rest of the city and society at large through locally controlled networks for the provision of essential services, such as fire protection, police

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[14] This example is based on an article by Celestine Bohlen, "A Sect of Muslims Feels Fundamentalist Threat," New York Times, 6/3/95, p. 2, except where otherwise noted. No other citation will be provided.

[15] Turkish national promotional brochure.

and education. Today, the old city center in Istanbul—where churches, synagogues and mosques, *medrese* and mission schools stand beside the bazaar and public buildings—provides a glimpse into this way of life, where diverse groups mingled while maintaining their own culture. But as reported in the newspaper, this *cemavi*, as the Alawite community center is called, "is more than a building. It reflects a newly awakened Alawite consciousness that is forcing its way through the cracks in Turkey's secular state and that burst onto the streets in March in several days of violent demonstrations."

The awakening of Alawite consciousness coincides with recent political gains by Sunni fundamentalists in Turkey, where 98 percent of the population is Muslim. Alawite Moslems believe in a more liberal version of Islam than the strict Sunni majority. Today Alawites, who number around twenty million, a third of Turkey's population, are relatively free to pursue their way of life, as demonstrated by the opening of community centers such as the one in Gazi and the publication of books on Alawite history and culture. But "they are fully aware that their freedoms are guaranteed by the state under a secular system," according to Msutafa Timisi, an Alawite political leader, who is deputy chairman of the Republican People's Party. After having been persecuted by the majority Sunnis during the Ottoman Empire, Alawites are very sensitive to renewed signs of discrimination and "they are ... fully aware that if ever a fundamentalist system was established in Turkey, their rights would be in danger." As a result, Alawite leaders hope to ensure that secularism remains a central tenet of the Turkish state, as it has been since Kemel Ataturk founded the republic 72 years ago.

Recently, however, Sunni Islam has again been on the rise in Turkey, particularly since the 1980 military coup. The Sunni resurgence has reached a point where the leader of the Gazi Mahallesi district, Newzat Altun, commented "We don't believe that the state is secular because they finance only one strain of religious thought while trying to assimilate the rest." Alawite children are required to learn a Sunni brand of Islam in school and mosques, which Alawites do not attend, are built with state money in their neighborhoods, staffed by imams whose training was also funded by the state. And the Alawites, generally considered to be politically tolerant and progressive, feel they are being forced out of local government jobs, either because of their politics or because they do not observe Sunni practices, such as public prayer, and for women, the wearing of veils.

After Sunni fundamentalists won the municipal elections in Istanbul in March 1994, representatives of the new administration went directly to the community center in Gazi, which was then under construction, and challenged its land and building permits. Eventually, according to the news account, "City Hall backed off, and construction continued." Soon afterward, however, a group of gunmen opened fire on three outdoor cafes on the main street in Gazi Mahallesi. When police did not respond promptly, Alawites from all over the city gathered to march in protest. Police attempting to turn back the crowds opened fire, and in the end, 34 people were dead. Huseyin Gulen, a leader of the cultural organization that runs the community center was quoted as saying: "Before we didn't feel the need to react to oppression. But firing bullets is something we could not accept."

The predicament of the Alawites can be understood in the context of the debate over the future of secularism in Turkey. One dimension of this understanding is to see the struggle over the community center in Gazi as an example of how the pressure for democratization, one consequence of globalization, builds in a large cosmopolitan Islamic city such as Istanbul. Here, as in other cities worldwide, the realm of local development serves as the arena in which this pressure reshapes the urban environment. In this way, the way that the community resolves competing claims for control of the use of urban land reflects the dynamics of social change taking place at higher levels of Turkish society. And once more we find groups reaching back to traditional patterns—in this case the neighborhood organized around religion for service delivery and local governance— as a model for delegating a degree of autonomy to subunits in order to accommodate the coexistence of diverse groups within a crowded urban space and encourage greater political and religious tolerance.

Jakarta: Kampung Greening and Cleaning Movement[16]

The population of Jakarta grew to an astounding 9.2 million by 1990, and the city's metropolitan region now covers an area with a radius of roughly 70 kilometers, extending from the downtown. Informal settlements surrounding Jakarta, known as kampungs, lack most municipal services and basic infrastructure such as paved roads,

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[16] This account is based on the text of the case study of Jakarta, as included in Janice Perlman, et al, 1994, "Manuscript Outline, Case Study Abstracts, Analytic Abstract," Urban Environment-Poverty Case Study Series, Mega-Cities Project, working document for the United Nations Development Program, New York. No other citation will be provided.

adequate drainage and clean water. As a result of the lack of sanitation, frequent flooding and over crowding, the environment of many kampungs has suffered serious degradation. Yet kampung residents often lack the resources, organizational capacity and political clout to improve conditions in their own neighborhoods. The Indonesian government has attempted to address the problems that arise in the kampungs, through centrally planned infrastructure projects. But not only did local governments and communities have little input in the process of planning these projects, they also lacked the resources to maintain them. To make matters worse, as the problems of the kampung grew more severe, due to the continuing growth of the Jakarta metropolitan region, federal support for municipal infrastructure projects decreased.

In recent years the federal government has shifted its approach to the alleviation of the problems of kampungs. Since 1989 the federal kampung policy is to encourage the private sector and local communities to become more involved in devising local development activities, in order to promote more sustainable kampung improvements. In support of this new policy "various packages of deregulation and debureacratization policies have been launched." But in order for communities to take more initiative in the development process, more attention must be paid to building the capacity of local leaders. The greening program in the kampung Bidara Cina is one such local solution that planners hope will serve as a model for wider implementation throughout Jakarta.

The Bidara Cina program is very simple: local community council members organized and motivated residents to participate in a gardening and clean-up program. The program uses local resources and has produced immediate results. Community

gardening programs are commonplace in large Western cities today, but represent a significant process innovation in the low income neighborhoods of Jakarta, which are organized along traditional, hierarchical lines. In the words of one technical reviewer,[17] it "transformed kampung residents from passive recipients of government assistance to active participants in their own development," thereby giving them valuable experience in organization and community action. This involves a substantial change in attitudes, given the local culture, and the design of new organizational structures, in which local residents assume more responsibility and accountability for improving their surroundings, without extensive input from the central government.

In 1990, nearly 44,294 people lived in Bidara Cina's 126 hectares, located along the Ciliwung River. These residents are illegally squatting on government owned land, and most are extremely poor. The average per capita income of residents of Bidara Cina is less than half of the national average. Bidara Cina is divided into fifteen community organizations known as Rukun Warga (RW) which consist of approximately 300-500 households. RW 14, which is situated along the riverbank, is the subject of this report. Frequent flooding, poor sewage systems and insufficient ventilation of the cramped, single story houses make RW 14 a particularly "dirty, squalid, unhealthy place to live." In 1992 a joint program was launched by federal and provincial government agencies, focused on greening, cleaning, sanitation and river cleaning. The local council for RW

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[17] The Mega-Cities Project examined the critical relationship between human activity at the community level and the sustainability of metropolitan environmental policy in the world's largest cities. Case studies included the Bidara Cina Greening project in Jakarta, the source for this example.

14, became very involved in the promotion of the cleaning and greening component of this government program, and eventually turned it into a project that was directed and funded by the community itself. The main objective of the program, in which local leaders encouraged residents to cultivate plants or small gardens in their yards, is to "develop among residents habits conducive to creating and maintaining a clean and green living environment." It is hoped that this involvement will expand the capacity of the community organization to take on more complex programs, such as solid waste management, home improvements, or riverbank development.

The RW 14 council has been effective in promoting the enthusiastic participation of residents, as evidenced by the large number of households willing to spend their own money on seeds. In addition the council conducted an information campaign, educating the residents about the importance of proper waste disposal. In doing so, the chairman of the RW council began to delegate tasks to other council members, a departure from past practice that helped made the operations of the council more transparent and accountable. In this way local leaders opened up the decision making process and began to democratize community based development activities.

The program in RW 14 was accompanied by extensive coverage in local newspapers, in an effort to spread the word to other communities, and a competition for the cleanest area in the district enhanced the participation of local residents. This publicity resulted in considerable interest from the leaders of local communities, many of whom have visited RW 14 with the intention of beginning similar programs. In addition, the federal kampung improvement project will assist the RW 14 council in launching a

city-wide "kampung greening movement." As the Megacities' report (p.20) notes, "Using

Bidara Cina as an example, the Kampung Greening Movement is also designed to foster a

democratized and community-led process which will eventually provide more

comprehensive and sustainable improvements in low income settlements."

As noted in the Megacities project team's evaluation of the Bidara Cina Greening

Project (pp. 26-28) this project serves less as a transferable model than as a successful

example of innovation.

> The crux of this innovation is the way a traditional community organization, in
> this case the community council, took on a new role in the implementation of an
> environmental and developmental project. ...[T]he government acted as the
> catalyst ... to promote local control and utilize local resources .... The Greening
> Program in Bidara Cina shows the capacity for development often lies within the
> communities themselves, in already existing, but underutilized groups. By
> adopting a new role and becoming community organizers, these groups can make
> development a more responsive and inclusive process, make projects cheaper and
> more successful, and expand and strengthen the role of an emerging civil society
> among the poor.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF ISLAMIC CITIES

In summary, a review of the literature suggests that we can come to several

conclusions about the general phenomenon of urban restructuring in response to global

forces. The extent to which these trends are evident in Islamic cities is directly related to

these cities' linkages to the regional and global systems through trade and information

flows. First, the globalization of the economy and the emergence of the "information age"

appears to be enhancing the role of the local community (particularly large cities) as the

level at which local economic interests coalesce and are best promoted. Second, despite powerful macro-economic forces and national political constraints that would appear to undermine local autonomy, there is room for cities to re-claim control over local development and shape their future environment.

Third, the degree of local autonomy—in many political systems—appears to be a function of the capacity of local interest groups to form coalitions and engage in collective action. This is a cumulative rather than "revolutionary" process since social learning is involved. Finally, in order to improve urban conditions, local communities often find it is easier to undertake redevelopment programs, than initiatives in other areas of social policy, such as education or welfare. And the impact of redevelopment projects often extend, symbolically, well beyond the boundaries of a site. As Clarence Stone tells us (1994; 24), in an era when many people have lost faith in planned intervention, redevelopment projects offer opportunities for change that resonate "through concrete efforts that demonstrate how small steps can cumulate into larger moves."

In this context we can understand how the redevelopment process is both shaped by and influences the local outcome of global economic restructuring processes. But urban redevelopment in response to restructuring is an open-ended process—it unfolds differently in each city. And the changes we observe in Islamic cities can not be characterized as simply the displacement of the traditional fabric by westernized forms imposed by modernization. That fact that Muslim cities have a distinctive flavor and character is undeniable. However alongside the symbols of Islamic culture and values, one also encounters the "overwhelming imprint of the modern era: unmistakable symbols

of international architecture, modern transportation systems, shantytowns and squatter settlements, industrial complexes, informal markets, and satellite cities," (Amirahmadi, 1993:1).

The emerging city scape is full of complexity and contradiction, reflecting the complex and contradictory impulses associated with global forces. For example, on the one hand global restructuring appears to lead to the dispersal of activities while on the other hand the process reinforces existing hierarchies and patterns of accumulation. Nevertheless, we can make some generalizations about the way in which the process is evolving in Islamic cities, that resembles similar patterns observed in the US and Europe. For example, there appears to be a convergent emergence of similar organizational and process innovations, to achieve mobilization of the nongovernment sector and democratization of local government. In every major city, we see the rise of civil society as a major social actor in local planning and governance. Moreover, we find progressive responses to redevelopment challenges occurring first and most robustly in the marginal neighborhoods of diverse and dynamic cities, where a variety of other innovations are taking place and where the pressure for change is greatest.

To the extent that Islamic cities seek to preserve their introverted nature, vis-a-vis the global system, the visible evidence of restructuring may be hard to detect, as a function of the controlled flow of information, into and out of those places. But we have seen that the sheer growth in the size of major Islamic cities and the consequent added complexity of the structure of metropolitan regions, triggers seemingly universal patterns of change, such as the decentralization and need for greater autonomy for administrative

sub-units. And while large Islamic cities may be able to prevent or delay the superficial impacts of globalization—in terms of physical forms and patterns of consumption—we have seen that the most important impact of globalization has been the opening up of the decision-making process involved in local development. In other words, the process of urban restructuring in response to globalization appears to be irreversible, even if the outcome is unpredetermined.

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